Journal of Modern Philosophy, Social Sciences and Humanities

ISSN NO:2720-4030

Volume 37 December, 2024

Socio-Philosophical Essence Of Freedom And Necessity

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ABSTRACT

The concept of freedom is associated with the idea of the activity of consciousness, the volitional efforts of a person in activity, the focus on cognition and transformation of external objects. In this article highlights of socio-philosophical essence of freedom and necessity

ARTICLEINFO

Received: 11th October

2024

Accepted: 8th November

2024

KEYWORDS:

freedom and necessity, activity, research, philosophical human determinism and indeterminism.

In the history of philosophy, a certain contradiction has been identified in the understanding of freedom since ancient times. It is related to the question of the conditioning of the human will. If the will is completely unconditioned, it actually ceases to be a will, since it has neither a guideline of direction, nor obstacles that it has to overcome.

Freedom in this case is just a random choice at random. But if the will itself is conditioned by something, it ceases to be free. It is already clear from this that freedom can only be spoken of in relative terms. This plan must be found between the opposing concepts that arise in connection with understanding the problem of free will: fatalism and voluntarism, determinism and indeterminism. Kant's desire to go beyond the deterministic world gives rise to a concept in which human existence is divided into being in the world of phenomena, where everything is truly deterministic and unfree, and being in an intelligent world, where a person can be free as a moral being.

Freedom is the ability of a person to act in accordance with his interests and goals, based on the knowledge of objective necessity. The concept of freedom has undergone a long evolution in history. The philosophy of human freedom was the subject of reflections by Kant and Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Sartre and Jaspers, Berdyaev and Solovyov.

Modern Western concepts of man mostly recognize him as a free being with a strong-willed personality. A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, A. Bergson should be mentioned here. Of the more modern ones, W—P. Sartre, the neo-pragmatist R. Rorty, the views of representatives of modern philosophical anthropology (A. Gehlen, N. Fink), the ideas of E. Fromm, G. Marcuse, and others. But the paradox of freedom is expressed in the fact that it withdraws itself into completed forms of being. N. Berdyaev draws attention to this fact, saying that every completed form is no longer creativity or freedom. This problem has been in philosophy for a long time. It has to do with the idea of human historical creativity. The essence of the issue lies in the fact that by expanding his influence on nature, increasing the power of his own productive forces, man creates more and more perfect forms of being. But these perfect forms of being naturally carry with them the moment of elimination of freedom for subsequent generations of people, who necessarily accept these forms as something already existing.

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Freedom was viewed in relation to necessity ("recognized necessity"), with arbitrariness and anarchy, with equality and justice. The range of understanding of this concept is extremely wide - from the complete denial of the very possibility of free choice (in the concepts of behaviorism) to the justification of "escape from freedom" (E. Fromm) in a modern civilized society.

Philosophers have long understood that there is a mystery in the nature of personality - a mystery related to consciousness, memory, and the life of the psyche. In the history of social thought, the problem of freedom has traditionally been reduced to the question of whether a person has free will, in other words, whether or not all his intentions and actions are conditioned by external circumstances. Some philosophers believe that people are not free to choose the objective conditions of their activities, however, they have the freedom to choose goals, since at any given moment there are usually not one, but several real possibilities, although with varying degrees of probability; even when there is no alternative, they are able to slow down the onset of undesirable consequences. to accelerate the approach of the desired phenomena.

Finally, each individual is more or less free to choose the means to achieve the goal. It follows from this that freedom is not absolute, but relative and is implemented by choosing a specific action plan. The greater it is, the more people are aware of their real capabilities, the more funds they have at their disposal to achieve their goals. Other researchers identify freedom with the concept of moral freedom, which is a value that a person strives to achieve, and the possession of which is good for him.

Considering Kant's idea of a person's ability to start a new cause-and-effect series, thereby demonstrating his freedom, P. Riker notes that in fact, a person always has the opportunity to start several new cause-and-effect series, between which he also has to choose. "Of course, we have a vivid feeling, a trusting confidence that we "can-do" every time an action that is in our power coincides with the results of an intervention carried out by all kinds of complete and relatively closed physical systems. But this direct understanding, this evidence of the "opportunity to do", can be perceived conceptually only in the form of a competition of several causalities."

At the same time, moral freedom is a condition for the manifestation of moral actions and actions of a person. In the Renaissance and the subsequent period, freedom was understood as the unhindered unfolding of a person's abilities. In the natural law concepts of modern times and the enlightenment, freedom was interpreted as an absolute value, as the basis of knowledge and law, as the basic premise of all natural human rights. Her inalienable character was emphasized, her property, which originally and unconditionally belongs to the individual. In classical European philosophy, attention was focused on two main points of such definitions: -understanding freedom as a recognized necessity, as the basis of thinking and cognition, and a person's ability to believe and be something.;

-the definition of freedom as a living breath (pulsation) of human self-development in history, which acts as a process of modification of freedom.

At the same time, the concepts of freedom and necessity are separated. This issue is considered from two opposite points of view - fatalism and voluntarism. Ethical fatalism, absolutizing necessity, puts a person in complete dependence on objective circumstances. Therefore, a person is not free in his actions: his whole life is predetermined, unable to change anything in it, and therefore he does not bear any responsibility for his actions.

Ethical voluntarism, on the contrary, denies all necessity and asserts that a person is absolutely free in his moral decisions and should act only in accordance with his own will. This understanding of freedom leads to a complete rejection of moral norms and the establishment of arbitrariness. But freedom is impossible without restrictions: the presence of restrictions is a necessary condition for everyone's freedom. Therefore, the justification of arbitrariness is nothing more than the denial of freedom. Thus, both fatalistic and voluntarist concepts ultimately deny moral freedom. The core of freedom is choice, which is provided by reason and will. Society determines the range of choices by its norms and limitations. This range also depends on the conditions for the realization of freedom, the prevailing forms of social activity, the level of development of society and the place of a person in the social system. The choice is free when all the intellectual and volitional abilities of a person are connected to it and when moral requirements merge with its internal needs. Based on this, freedom has two aspects: negative and positive.

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Negative freedom is "freedom from", a freedom that denies and destroys dependence on the forces of nature, social moral dogmas and attitudes. Such freedom brings a person independence and at the same time - a feeling of loneliness, powerlessness and anxiety. In these conditions, a person is again faced with a choice: either to get rid of this freedom with the help of a new dependence, a new subordination, or to grow to positive freedom. Positive freedom is "freedom for", which gives the opportunity for the full realization of intellectual and emotional abilities, requiring this realization from the individual, freedom based on the uniqueness and individuality of each person. Before a modern person who has gained freedom (in the "old", negative sense), two paths open up. The first is the further movement towards a "new", positive freedom, the main ways to achieve which are love and creativity. The second way is to "escape" from this genuine freedom. Freedom is a specific way of being of a person, associated with his ability to choose a decision and act in accordance with his goals, interests, ideals and assessments based on awareness of the objective properties and relationships of things, patterns of the surrounding world.

Freedom exists where there is a choice. But only freedom of choice generates personal responsibility for the decision made and the actions that result from it. Freedom and responsibility are two sides of conscious human activity. Freedom breeds responsibility, responsibility guides freedom.

Of course, a person is not a cybernetic machine capable of making an accurate decision according to a given program, if there is enough raw data for this. Most human decisions are decisions with a certain degree of probability, decisions that are influenced by the initial attitudes of consciousness and the emotional states of the moment. And yet, I don't think we can say that there is nothing inside the gap. When making decisions in conditions of limited information, and in most cases these are human decisions, including very important ones, because we do not know what the world is like in some ultimate sense, but still proceed from some interpretation of the world. But this interpretation itself is not exclusively our property. It is historically conditioned and based on stable ideological structures, which is the case even in science, if we take into account the process of changing scientific paradigms. This means that once again, factors are manifesting themselves that can be considered as the elimination of personal freedom of choice, or rather, as something that turns such a choice into some kind of illusion.

Nevertheless, a person has doubts, thinks about the most probable processes of interpretation, calculates the probability of what events may occur. But what lies behind all these doubts? How does freedom manifest itself at the level of synoptic processes? To answer this question, we need to briefly talk about what is ideal. In the philosophical tradition, there are many interpretations of the specifics of human spiritual activity, starting with naive materialistic ones (the subtle fire of Heraclitus) and ending with the developed idealistic systems of Plato, Hegel, M. Scheler and others, in which the ideal exists in the form of a spirit with its own special ontological status. But Plato could be asked the question, if there is a world of ideas as independent ontological entities, then why is it not a material world, why is it not some kind of special matter.

And it is no coincidence that Plato's disciple Aristotle explicitly stated that form is also made of matter, only of a special kind of matter. Since matter, according to Aristotle, is generally what everything is made of, "then form is made of matter, [but of matter] peculiar to form". Isn't this an example of misunderstanding the nature of the ideal? But not far from Aristotle, the materialist Democritus also left, who believed that the ideal is a cast caused by the influence of subtle matter separating from a thing. In reality, the ideal is the playing out of the brain signals of the state of reality (the world), attributed to some future point in time. Such a game makes it possible to reflect reality ahead of time at the level of ideal images. They create an idea of what the reality will be at a future point in time and what the optimal way will be, the actions of the subject at this moment in time and in this changed reality.

At the same time, the range of the future is very wide — starting from preparing an animal to jump during hunting and ending with those abstract ideas (ideas about new technical systems or new forms of social organization) that only humans can create thanks to conceptual thinking. But now the main thing is not to emphasize this, but to emphasize that in order to carry out such a "game with images", the brain of a human or animal with a psyche must have a hypothetical, model nature, i.e. he must have the ability to arbitrarily assume as many possible states of the world as possible. This is where freedom lies at the synoptic level. It is in the system of those arbitrary constructions that the brain is able to create, without direct control from consciousness, desires, emotional states, etc. Of course, when creating ideas about future states of the world,

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we use past experience, ideas about what is possible in principle in our reality, but this in itself does not negate that freedom. which is contained in the hypothesizing activity of the brain. Of the variations developed as a result of such involuntary brain activity, the subject, represented in the brain game both as an observer and as an observed one, chooses the most optimal, i.e. the most likely to lead to success, action option.

Freedom is a person's ability to realize their interests and needs without violating the rights of others and taking into account their responsibility to society. This is a necessity, that is, those laws that operate independently of a person, but must be respected by them. Freedom and the need for human activity are recognized by modern States as significant and enshrined in official documents.

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