

A Comparative Study Of The Philosophy Of Time: Ontological Perspectives In Ibn Sina, Henri Bergson, And Martin Heidegger

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ABSTRACT

Time is one of the central problems in the history of philosophy and has been interpreted differently across Eastern and Western traditions. This article comparatively examines the conceptions of time developed by Ibn Sina, Henri Bergson, and Martin Heidegger, focusing on their views of motion, existence, consciousness, and eternity. The study applies comparative, historical-philosophical, hermeneutic, and systematic methods. Ibn Sina understands time as an objective measure of motion while distinguishing it from divine eternity; Bergson interprets time as *durée*, a qualitative and indivisible flow of consciousness; Heidegger views temporality as the fundamental ontological horizon of *Dasein*. The study shows that these approaches represent different but complementary models of temporality, reflecting the transition from metaphysical and cosmological interpretations to phenomenological and existential ones. Its novelty lies in integrating the three philosophical traditions within a unified comparative framework and demonstrating their relevance to comparative philosophy, ontology, and intercultural philosophical dialogue.

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Introduction. Time has occupied a central position in philosophical inquiry since antiquity, representing one of the most profound and enduring problems in metaphysics, ontology, and the philosophy of human existence. Unlike physical sciences, where time is primarily treated as a measurable parameter describing change and motion, philosophy investigates time as a fundamental condition of being, consciousness, and reality itself. Throughout the history of philosophical thought, different intellectual traditions have developed distinct conceptions of temporality, reflecting their broader metaphysical, epistemological, and anthropological commitments. Consequently, the philosophy of time remains a crucial field for understanding not only the structure of reality but also the nature of human existence and the limits of philosophical knowledge.

The contemporary relevance of the philosophy of time has significantly increased in the context of globalization, intercultural dialogue, technological transformation, and the rapid development of modern science. Advances in theoretical physics, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence have generated renewed debates concerning the nature of temporality, consciousness, and human experience. These developments demonstrate that philosophical investigations of time continue to possess both theoretical and

methodological significance. In this context, comparative philosophical studies provide an important opportunity to explore how different intellectual traditions conceptualize temporal reality and to identify both their shared assumptions and their distinctive approaches.

Among the philosophers who have profoundly influenced the development of temporal thought, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Henri Bergson, and Martin Heidegger occupy particularly significant positions. Although they belong to different historical periods and philosophical traditions, each developed an original interpretation of time that substantially transformed subsequent philosophical discourse. Their theories represent three influential paradigms of temporal understanding: the metaphysical-objective conception, the phenomenological-psychological conception, and the existential-ontological conception.

Within the tradition of Islamic Peripatetic philosophy, Ibn Sina elaborated Aristotle's theory of time while integrating it into his comprehensive metaphysical system. He regarded time as the quantitative measure of motion and as an essential attribute of the created world, while simultaneously distinguishing temporal existence from divine eternity. His interpretation establishes a coherent relationship between cosmology, metaphysics, and theology, making temporality a fundamental principle of created existence rather than merely a physical phenomenon.

Henri Bergson fundamentally challenged the classical understanding of time by introducing the concept of *durée* (duration). Rejecting the reduction of time to mathematical succession or spatial measurement, he argued that genuine temporality is experienced as an indivisible, qualitative continuity within consciousness. Bergson's philosophy shifted the discussion of time from objective measurement toward lived experience, memory, creativity, and freedom, thereby laying important foundations for twentieth-century phenomenology and process-oriented philosophy.

Martin Heidegger introduced another decisive transformation through his existential analysis of temporality in *Being and Time*. Rather than considering time as an external property of the world or a psychological phenomenon, Heidegger argued that temporality constitutes the fundamental ontological horizon within which human existence (*Dasein*) becomes intelligible. His conception reoriented the philosophy of time toward questions of authenticity, finitude, historical existence, and the meaning of Being itself.

Although these philosophers have each received extensive scholarly attention, existing research has largely examined their theories independently within separate philosophical traditions. Studies of Ibn Sina generally focus on Islamic metaphysics and Aristotelian philosophy, Bergson is predominantly interpreted within the context of the philosophy of life and phenomenology, whereas Heidegger's concept of temporality is usually investigated from the perspective of existential ontology. Consequently, relatively few studies have undertaken a systematic comparative analysis capable of demonstrating both the conceptual continuity and the methodological differences among these three influential conceptions of time.

This absence of an integrated comparative perspective constitutes the principal research gap addressed in the present study. A comparative examination of Ibn Sina, Bergson, and Heidegger not only contributes to a deeper understanding of their individual philosophical systems but also reveals the historical transformation of temporal thought from metaphysical cosmology to phenomenological experience and existential ontology. Such an approach enriches intercultural philosophical dialogue by demonstrating that Eastern and Western traditions are connected through common philosophical questions despite employing different conceptual frameworks and methodological assumptions.

Accordingly, the primary objective of this article is to conduct a comparative philosophical analysis of the concept of time in the works of Ibn Sina, Henri Bergson, and Martin Heidegger. The study seeks to identify the ontological status of time in each philosophical system, examine the relationship between time, motion, consciousness, existence, and eternity, and evaluate the methodological principles underlying their respective theories. Through historical-philosophical, comparative, hermeneutic, and systematic methods of analysis, the article aims to construct a unified analytical framework for interpreting these diverse conceptions of temporality.

The originality of this research lies in bringing together three major philosophical traditions—Islamic metaphysics, French vitalism, and German existential phenomenology—within a single comparative methodological framework. Rather than treating these traditions as isolated intellectual systems, the study

argues that they represent complementary perspectives on one of philosophy's most fundamental questions. By revealing both the convergences and the differences among their theories of time, the article contributes to comparative philosophy, contemporary ontology, and the ongoing dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.

The findings of this research may provide a theoretical foundation for further interdisciplinary studies on the philosophy of time and contribute to broader discussions concerning metaphysics, phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, and intercultural philosophy in contemporary academic scholarship.

Literature Review. The philosophy of time has remained one of the most extensively debated subjects in both classical and contemporary philosophy. From Aristotle's definition of time as the measure of motion to contemporary phenomenological and existential interpretations, temporality has served as a central concept through which philosophers have explored the nature of reality, consciousness, and human existence (Aristotle, 1984; Ricoeur, 1984; Heidegger, 1962). Although Eastern and Western philosophical traditions have developed distinct theoretical frameworks concerning time, comparative investigations integrating these traditions remain relatively limited (Adamson, 2016; McGinnis, 2023).

The classical foundation for philosophical discussions of time was established by Aristotle, who defined time as the "number of motion with respect to before and after" (Aristotle, 1984). This conception profoundly influenced medieval Islamic philosophy and became the starting point for Ibn Sina's metaphysical reinterpretation of temporality. Modern scholarship generally agrees that Ibn Sina did not merely reproduce Aristotelian physics but reconstructed it within an original metaphysical system (Gutas, 2014; McGinnis, 2010). Gutas (2014) argues that Ibn Sina transformed Aristotelian natural philosophy by integrating cosmology, metaphysics, and theology into a unified philosophical framework. Similarly, McGinnis (2010, 2023) demonstrates that Ibn Sina's theory of time cannot be understood independently of his broader ontology of existence, causality, and creation.

Recent studies on Ibn Sina have increasingly emphasized the originality of his metaphysical interpretation of temporality (Adamson, 2016; McGinnis, 2023). Rather than considering time exclusively as a physical phenomenon, contemporary researchers interpret his theory as an attempt to explain the ontological relationship between the created universe and divine eternity. These investigations have significantly expanded our understanding of Avicennian metaphysics; however, they generally remain confined to the historical context of Islamic philosophy and rarely examine its possible dialogue with modern European theories of temporality (Gutas, 2014).

Research on Henri Bergson has followed a different trajectory. Bergson's philosophy of duration (*durée*) is widely regarded as one of the most influential critiques of mechanistic and quantitative conceptions of time (Bergson, 1911/2001). Scholars have extensively examined the relationship between duration, consciousness, memory, creativity, and freedom (Deleuze, 1991; Ricoeur, 1984). Ricoeur (1984) considers Bergson's theory indispensable for understanding narrative temporality and human experience, while Deleuze (1991) interprets duration as a dynamic ontology of becoming rather than a merely psychological phenomenon. Contemporary discussions further emphasize Bergson's relevance to cognitive science, process philosophy, and phenomenology (Mullarkey, 1999). Nevertheless, most of these studies concentrate on Bergson's intellectual legacy within twentieth-century European philosophy and rarely compare his conception of lived temporality with earlier metaphysical traditions such as that of Ibn Sina.

The philosophical significance of Martin Heidegger's conception of temporality has generated an extensive body of international scholarship. Since the publication of *Being and Time*, researchers have analyzed temporality primarily within the framework of existential ontology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics (Heidegger, 1962; Inwood, 1999). Heidegger's notion of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is generally interpreted as the fundamental condition through which Dasein discloses the meaning of Being (Heidegger, 1962). Inwood (1999) emphasizes that Heidegger radically transformed the traditional philosophy of time by replacing cosmological explanations with existential analysis. Subsequent scholarship has explored the implications of this transformation for hermeneutics, philosophical anthropology, ethics, and contemporary continental philosophy (Dreyfus, 1991; Carman, 2003). However, these studies typically investigate Heidegger independently from both Islamic metaphysics and Bergsonian philosophy.

A growing body of comparative philosophy has encouraged dialogue between Eastern and Western intellectual traditions (Deutsch, 1985; Ganeri, 2017). Nevertheless, the majority of comparative studies have focused on ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, or political philosophy, while comparatively few have addressed the philosophy of time as a shared conceptual problem. Existing comparisons frequently examine only two philosophers or two traditions, such as Aristotle and Ibn Sina, Bergson and Heidegger, or phenomenology and Islamic philosophy. Consequently, there remains a noticeable absence of studies that systematically compare Ibn Sina, Bergson, and Heidegger within a single analytical framework.

This gap is particularly significant because these philosophers represent three distinct yet historically connected stages in the development of temporal thought. Ibn Sina develops an objective-metaphysical understanding of time grounded in cosmology (McGinnis, 2010; Gutas, 2014); Bergson reconstructs temporality as qualitative duration experienced through consciousness (Bergson, 1911/2001; Deleuze, 1991); and Heidegger redefines temporality as the ontological structure of human existence (Heidegger, 1962; Inwood, 1999). Examining these perspectives together provides opportunities to identify conceptual continuities, methodological transformations, and fundamental philosophical differences that remain insufficiently explored in existing scholarship.

The present study seeks to address this gap by employing a unified comparative-philosophical methodology that integrates historical analysis, hermeneutic interpretation, and conceptual comparison. Rather than treating Islamic metaphysics, French vitalism, and German existential phenomenology as isolated intellectual traditions, this research argues that they constitute complementary philosophical responses to a common question concerning the nature of temporality. Such an approach contributes not only to comparative philosophy but also to contemporary discussions in ontology, phenomenology, intercultural philosophy, and the philosophy of human existence (Ganeri, 2017; Adamson, 2016).

Ibn Sina's Ontology of Time: Motion, Existence, and Eternity. Among medieval philosophers, Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037) developed one of the most systematic and philosophically sophisticated theories of time within the Islamic intellectual tradition. While his conception of temporality originates from Aristotle's *Physics*, Ibn Sina did not merely reproduce Aristotelian doctrine; rather, he reconstructed the concept of time within a comprehensive metaphysical framework integrating natural philosophy, ontology, cosmology, and theology (Aristotle, 1984; Avicenna, 2005; Gutas, 2014). Consequently, time became not only a category of physical reality but also an indispensable element in explaining the hierarchical structure of existence.

For Ibn Sina, time cannot be understood independently of motion (*ḥaraka*) and corporeal existence. Following Aristotle, he defines time as the measure of motion with respect to priority and posteriority (Aristotle, 1984; Avicenna, 2005). However, unlike a purely physical interpretation, Ibn Sina emphasizes that motion itself presupposes the existence of changing substances. Time therefore depends upon the dynamic structure of the created universe rather than existing as an independent substance. In this respect, temporality is inseparable from the ontological constitution of the material world (McGinnis, 2010).

This interpretation reveals an important philosophical distinction. Time is neither identical with motion nor reducible to subjective perception. Rather, motion provides the ontological condition through which time becomes intelligible. Without change there would be no temporal succession, yet time itself functions as the universal order according to which change is measured and understood. Thus, Ibn Sina preserves the objective reality of temporality while avoiding its substantialization (Avicenna, 2005; McGinnis, 2010).

A distinctive feature of Ibn Sina's philosophy is the close relationship between time and existence (*wujūd*). Within his metaphysical system, every contingent being exists through a continuous process of actualization. Since contingent existence unfolds through change, generation, and corruption, temporality characterizes the very mode of existence of the created universe. Time therefore possesses ontological significance rather than merely mathematical or astronomical importance (Avicenna, 2005; Adamson, 2016).

At the same time, Ibn Sina carefully distinguishes temporality from eternity (*sarmad*). One of the central achievements of his metaphysics is the clarification of different modes of existence. Created beings exist within temporal succession, whereas the Necessary Existent (God) transcends all temporal

determination. Divine existence is neither extended through time nor composed of successive moments. Eternity, therefore, should not be understood as infinite time but as an entirely different ontological mode beyond temporal succession (Avicenna, 2005; Gutas, 2014).

This distinction resolves a fundamental philosophical problem inherited from Greek philosophy: how an eternal cause can produce a temporal universe. Ibn Sina argues that divine causality does not occur within time; rather, time itself belongs exclusively to the created order. Consequently, temporal becoming and eternal causality operate on different ontological levels. Such a solution profoundly influenced later Islamic philosophy, medieval scholasticism, and subsequent metaphysical discussions concerning creation and existence (Adamson, 2016; McGinnis, 2023).

Another important dimension of Ibn Sina's theory concerns the epistemology of time. Human beings do not directly perceive time as an independent object. Instead, temporal awareness arises through the perception of successive changes occurring in external reality. The intellect abstracts the concept of time by recognizing ordered sequences of motion. Accordingly, temporal knowledge possesses both empirical and rational dimensions: sensory perception provides awareness of change, while intellectual abstraction constructs the universal concept of temporality (Avicenna, 2005).

This epistemological position demonstrates the remarkable balance characteristic of Ibn Sina's philosophical method. Unlike later phenomenological theories, he does not identify time with subjective consciousness. Simultaneously, unlike certain purely physical interpretations, he avoids reducing temporality to quantitative measurement alone. Time emerges as an objective feature of reality that becomes cognitively accessible through rational analysis of motion and change (McGinnis, 2010).

From a comparative perspective, Ibn Sina's conception represents an objective-metaphysical model of temporality. The existence of time does not depend upon human consciousness; rather, consciousness discovers an already existing temporal order embedded within the cosmos. Such an interpretation contrasts sharply with Bergson's emphasis on lived duration and Heidegger's existential analysis of temporality. Nevertheless, Ibn Sina establishes an indispensable philosophical foundation for later discussions by demonstrating that temporality cannot be separated from broader ontological questions concerning existence, causality, and the structure of reality (Avicenna, 2005; McGinnis, 2023).

Modern scholarship increasingly recognizes that Ibn Sina's philosophy of time extends far beyond a medieval commentary on Aristotle. Contemporary researchers argue that his reinterpretation of temporality anticipates later metaphysical debates concerning the relationship between existence, causality, and divine transcendence. His distinction between temporal existence and eternal being continues to offer valuable conceptual resources for contemporary philosophy of religion, comparative metaphysics, and intercultural philosophy (Adamson, 2016; McGinnis, 2023).

Therefore, Ibn Sina's theory of time should be understood as a sophisticated ontological synthesis in which motion, existence, causality, and eternity constitute an internally coherent philosophical system. Rather than viewing temporality as an isolated physical phenomenon, Ibn Sina demonstrates that time expresses one of the fundamental structures through which created reality becomes intelligible. This metaphysical understanding provides the conceptual point of departure for the subsequent transformation of temporal philosophy in Bergson and Heidegger, whose approaches progressively shift attention from objective cosmology toward consciousness and existential being (Gutas, 2014; McGinnis, 2023).

Henri Bergson's Concept of Duration: Consciousness, Creativity, and Lived Time. Henri Bergson's philosophy marks a decisive turning point in the history of the philosophy of time. Whereas classical metaphysics, from Aristotle to Ibn Sina, primarily understood time through its relation to motion and the objective order of the cosmos, Bergson redirected philosophical attention toward lived experience (*temps vécu*). His theory of *durée* (duration) represents not merely a modification of earlier conceptions but a fundamental transformation in the way temporality is conceived. Time is no longer interpreted as an external measure of movement; rather, it becomes the dynamic structure of conscious life itself (Bergson, 1911/2001; Deleuze, 1991).

Bergson's critique begins with what he calls the "spatialization of time." According to him, both classical philosophy and modern science tend to treat time as if it were analogous to space: homogeneous, divisible, measurable, and composed of successive units. Such a conception allows mathematical calculation

but fails to capture the genuine nature of temporal experience. The clock measures intervals, yet it does not measure the lived reality of becoming. Consequently, quantitative time should be distinguished from real duration (Bergson, 1911/2001).

The concept of *durée* constitutes the central principle of Bergson's philosophy. Duration is not a succession of isolated moments but an indivisible continuity in which past, present, and future interpenetrate. Every present moment carries within itself the accumulated experience of the past while simultaneously opening new possibilities for the future. Temporal consciousness therefore develops as an uninterrupted flow rather than as a sequence of discrete instants (Bergson, 1911/2001; Deleuze, 1991).

This interpretation introduces an essential philosophical innovation. Time is understood qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Whereas measurable time consists of identical units arranged in succession, duration consists of continuously changing qualities that cannot be separated without destroying their living unity. Bergson therefore argues that the essence of time lies not in numerical succession but in continuous transformation (Bergson, 1911/2001).

Memory occupies a fundamental place within this conception of temporality. Bergson rejects the notion that memory merely stores representations of previous experiences. Instead, memory actively constitutes the continuity of consciousness. The past is never entirely absent; it survives within the present and continually influences perception, decision, and action. Consequently, personal identity emerges not from static substance but from the continuous integration of lived experience (Bergson, 1896/1991; Ricoeur, 1984).

This intimate relationship between duration and memory also explains Bergson's understanding of freedom. If consciousness consisted of mechanically connected moments, genuine freedom would be impossible because every action would be determined by preceding events. However, because duration is creative and indivisible, each decision expresses the entire history of the person while simultaneously producing something genuinely new. Freedom therefore appears not as the absence of causality but as the creative unfolding of the self through temporal continuity (Bergson, 1911/2001).

Bergson's emphasis on creativity further distinguishes his philosophy from classical metaphysical conceptions of time. Reality is not a completed structure governed exclusively by immutable laws; rather, it is an ongoing process of creative evolution. Time is the very medium through which novelty becomes possible. Every act of becoming introduces possibilities that could not have been fully predicted from preceding states. Thus, temporality possesses an essentially productive character (Bergson, 1907/1998; Mullarkey, 1999).

The methodological foundation of Bergson's theory differs significantly from rationalist metaphysics. He argues that the deepest structures of reality cannot be fully grasped through abstract conceptual analysis alone. Instead, they require intuition (*intuition philosophique*), understood not as irrational feeling but as a direct philosophical insight into the continuity of lived experience. Intuition enables philosophy to penetrate the inner movement of reality that conceptual thought often fragments into static categories (Bergson, 1911/2001; Deleuze, 1991).

This methodological position has profound implications for the philosophy of time. Whereas scientific knowledge analyzes reality by dividing it into measurable components, intuition apprehends duration as an indivisible whole. Bergson therefore does not reject scientific knowledge; rather, he argues that science and philosophy investigate different dimensions of reality. Science successfully explains measurable processes, whereas philosophy seeks to understand the qualitative experience underlying those processes (Bergson, 1911/2001).

From a comparative perspective, Bergson both continues and transforms earlier philosophical traditions. Unlike Ibn Sina, who grounds temporality within the objective order of motion and existence, Bergson relocates the center of temporal analysis to conscious experience. Nevertheless, both philosophers reject the reduction of time to arbitrary convention. For Ibn Sina, time expresses the ontological order of creation; for Bergson, it expresses the living continuity of consciousness. In both cases, temporality possesses a reality that exceeds purely mathematical representation (Avicenna, 2005; Bergson, 1911/2001).

At the same time, Bergson prepares the way for Heidegger's existential analysis of temporality. His emphasis on lived experience, continuity, and the inseparability of temporal existence from human life

anticipates several themes later developed within phenomenology. However, an important distinction remains. Bergson primarily investigates the dynamics of consciousness, whereas Heidegger shifts the discussion toward the ontological structure of existence itself. Thus, Bergson occupies an intermediate position between classical metaphysical theories of time and twentieth-century existential philosophy (Ricoeur, 1984; Mullarkey, 1999).

The originality of Bergson's philosophy lies in demonstrating that temporality is not merely an object of knowledge but the very condition through which life, creativity, and personal identity become possible. His theory of duration transformed the philosophy of time by replacing static conceptions of succession with a dynamic understanding of continuous becoming. Consequently, Bergson established one of the principal intellectual foundations for modern phenomenology, process philosophy, and contemporary investigations into consciousness and human temporality (Deleuze, 1991; Mullarkey, 1999).

Martin Heidegger's Existential Ontology of Temporality. Martin Heidegger's philosophy represents one of the most influential reconceptualizations of time in twentieth-century thought. In *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*, 1927), Heidegger challenges the long-standing metaphysical tradition that treated time primarily as an objective sequence of measurable moments. Instead, he argues that temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) constitutes the fundamental ontological horizon through which the meaning of Being can be understood. Consequently, the question of time becomes inseparable from the question of human existence (Heidegger, 1962; Inwood, 1999).

Heidegger's departure from the classical tradition begins with his critique of the "vulgar" or ordinary conception of time. According to this view, inherited from Aristotelian physics and reinforced by modern science, time is understood as a succession of homogeneous "nows" that can be measured objectively. Although such an interpretation is indispensable for scientific inquiry, Heidegger maintains that it conceals the deeper existential structure of temporality. Clock time describes entities within the world but fails to explain how human existence itself is temporal (Heidegger, 1962; Dreyfus, 1991).

The central concept of Heidegger's philosophy is *Dasein*, literally "being-there." Unlike traditional notions of the human subject, *Dasein* is not a detached observer confronting an external world. Rather, it is a mode of existence that is always already involved in the world, interpreting itself through its relationships, projects, and possibilities. Temporality is therefore not an attribute that *Dasein* possesses; it is the very structure through which *Dasein* exists (Heidegger, 1962; Carman, 2003).

This insight leads Heidegger to redefine time as an existential phenomenon. Human existence is fundamentally future-oriented because individuals constantly project themselves toward possibilities that have not yet been realized. The future is therefore not merely what comes after the present; it is the dimension through which existence acquires direction and meaning. At the same time, these projections are grounded in a past that has already shaped one's identity and are enacted within the present through concrete engagement with the world. Temporality thus emerges as a unified and dynamic structure rather than a linear succession of isolated moments (Heidegger, 1962).

Heidegger describes this structure as the "ecstatic unity" of temporality. The future (*Zukunft*), the past (*Gewesenheit*), and the present (*Gegenwart*) are not independent temporal regions but mutually constitutive dimensions of existence. The future expresses projection toward possibilities; the past signifies the factual conditions into which *Dasein* has been "thrown"; and the present refers to practical involvement in the world. Together these dimensions reveal that temporality is the existential horizon within which human life unfolds (Heidegger, 1962; Inwood, 1999).

One of Heidegger's most original contributions is his analysis of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*). Everyday existence often becomes absorbed in routine social conventions, preventing individuals from confronting the finite nature of their own lives. Authentic existence arises when *Dasein* recognizes its own mortality through the anticipation of death (*Sein-zum-Tode*). This anticipation is not a pessimistic preoccupation but an existential disclosure that enables individuals to assume responsibility for their own possibilities. Time thus acquires ethical and existential significance because awareness of finitude transforms the manner in which life is lived (Heidegger, 1962; Dreyfus, 1991).

Mortality occupies a central place in Heidegger's philosophy of time. Death is not simply a biological event occurring at the end of life but the ultimate possibility that accompanies existence from the very

beginning. The certainty of death individualizes *Dasein* by revealing that no one can live or die on another's behalf. Consequently, temporality becomes inseparable from human freedom, responsibility, and authenticity. Unlike objective chronology, existential time expresses the finite structure of human existence itself (Heidegger, 1962; Blattner, 1999).

Methodologically, Heidegger develops his theory through phenomenological hermeneutics. Rather than constructing an abstract metaphysical system, he investigates the structures of lived existence as they reveal themselves in experience. Phenomenology enables him to describe how temporality is disclosed through practical engagement, care (*Sorge*), historical situatedness, and existential decision-making. Hermeneutics, in turn, explains how understanding is always conditioned by temporal existence. Time is therefore not simply an object of philosophical reflection but the condition that makes understanding possible (Heidegger, 1962; Gadamer, 2004).

From a comparative perspective, Heidegger both continues and transforms the philosophical developments represented by Ibn Sina and Bergson. Ibn Sina explains temporality through the metaphysical order of creation and motion, whereas Bergson interprets time as the qualitative continuity of consciousness. Heidegger moves beyond both positions by arguing that temporality is neither primarily an objective cosmological category nor merely a psychological phenomenon. Instead, it constitutes the ontological condition of human existence itself. In this sense, Heidegger shifts philosophical attention from the question "What is time?" to the more fundamental question "How does temporality make existence meaningful?" (Avicenna, 2005; Bergson, 1911/2001; Heidegger, 1962).

Despite these differences, significant conceptual continuities may also be identified. Like Ibn Sina, Heidegger regards time as inseparable from the structure of Being, although the meaning of "Being" differs profoundly in their respective systems. Similarly, Heidegger shares with Bergson the conviction that authentic temporality cannot be reduced to measurable clock time. Nevertheless, his existential analysis transcends both traditions by integrating temporality into the question of Being itself (Heidegger, 1962; Ricoeur, 1984).

Heidegger's philosophy has profoundly influenced contemporary ontology, phenomenology, hermeneutics, existential psychology, and philosophical anthropology. His reinterpretation of temporality demonstrates that time is not merely a framework within which life occurs but the very horizon through which existence, freedom, and meaning become intelligible. Consequently, temporality emerges as the most fundamental existential structure underlying human self-understanding and historical existence (Inwood, 1999; Carman, 2003; Blattner, 1999).

Conclusion. The comparative analysis of Ibn Sina, Henri Bergson, and Martin Heidegger demonstrates that the philosophy of time has undergone a profound historical transformation. Rather than representing isolated philosophical doctrines, their conceptions reveal successive stages in the development of temporal thought. Each philosopher redefines the meaning of time according to a distinct ontological framework, epistemological method, and understanding of human existence. Consequently, temporality emerges as a multidimensional philosophical category whose interpretation evolves alongside changing conceptions of reality and Being (Gutas, 2014; McGinnis, 2023; Heidegger, 1962).

The first major point of comparison concerns the ontological status of time. Ibn Sina conceives time as an objective characteristic of the created universe. Time exists independently of human consciousness because it is inseparably connected with motion and the ontological structure of contingent beings (McGinnis, 2010, 2023). Bergson fundamentally shifts this perspective by locating the essence of temporality within lived consciousness. For him, genuine time is not an objective sequence measurable by clocks but the qualitative continuity of experience (*durée*) (Bergson, 1910/2001). Heidegger advances this transformation even further by arguing that temporality is neither primarily objective nor psychological. Instead, it constitutes the existential horizon through which *Dasein* understands itself and discloses the meaning of Being (Heidegger, 1962). This progression illustrates a movement from cosmological objectivity through phenomenological subjectivity toward existential ontology.

A second point of comparison concerns the relationship between time and motion. Ibn Sina preserves the Aristotelian principle that time is intelligible only through motion (McGinnis, 2010). Motion provides the condition under which temporal succession becomes meaningful. Bergson criticizes this dependence by

arguing that the deepest reality of time cannot be reduced to physical movement. Duration is experienced internally as the uninterrupted flow of consciousness rather than as externally observable change (Bergson, 1910/2001). Heidegger, however, removes motion from the center of the discussion altogether. For him, temporality originates in existential projection rather than physical processes. Human beings experience time because they exist as beings constantly projecting themselves toward future possibilities while interpreting their past and acting within the present (Heidegger, 1962).

The relationship between temporality and consciousness also reveals significant philosophical differences. Ibn Sina regards consciousness as the means through which human beings recognize temporal order, but consciousness does not create time itself (McGinnis, 2010). Bergson reverses this relationship by maintaining that consciousness constitutes the primary reality in which authentic temporality is disclosed (Bergson, 1910/2001). Without lived experience, measurable time would remain an abstract intellectual construction. Heidegger broadens the discussion by replacing the philosophy of consciousness with an ontology of existence. Temporality is not grounded in mental processes alone but in the existential structure of *Dasein* (Heidegger, 1962). Consciousness therefore becomes only one aspect of a more comprehensive analysis of Being.

An equally important distinction concerns the relationship between time and eternity. Ibn Sina establishes a clear ontological separation between temporality and divine eternity. Time characterizes contingent existence, whereas eternity belongs exclusively to the Necessary Existent (Gutas, 2014; McGinnis, 2023). This distinction safeguards both divine transcendence and the metaphysical order of creation. Bergson rarely employs eternity as a theological category, preferring to emphasize the inexhaustible creativity of duration itself (Bergson, 1911/2007). Heidegger, by contrast, deliberately suspends metaphysical speculation concerning eternity and focuses instead on finite existence. His analysis demonstrates that authentic temporality is inseparable from mortality, making finitude rather than eternity the decisive condition of human existence (Heidegger, 1962).

The methodological foundations of the three philosophical systems further demonstrate the diversity of their approaches. Ibn Sina develops his theory through rational demonstration and metaphysical analysis rooted in the Peripatetic tradition (Gutas, 2014). Bergson challenges purely conceptual reasoning by introducing philosophical intuition as the appropriate method for grasping duration (Bergson, 1911/2007). Heidegger employs phenomenological hermeneutics, arguing that temporality can only be understood through the interpretation of lived existence (Heidegger, 1962; Inwood, 1999). These methodological differences illustrate not merely alternative techniques of philosophical inquiry but fundamentally different conceptions of how reality itself should be approached.

Despite these differences, several important conceptual convergences can also be identified. None of the three philosophers reduces time to a purely mathematical or physical variable. Each insists that temporality possesses a deeper philosophical significance extending beyond scientific measurement. Furthermore, all three regard time as inseparable from the question of existence, although they understand existence in different ways (McGinnis, 2023; Ricoeur, 1984). Ibn Sina associates temporality with the ontological structure of contingent beings; Bergson relates it to the continuity of conscious life; Heidegger interprets it as the existential horizon within which Being becomes meaningful. Their shared rejection of reductionist interpretations demonstrates the enduring philosophical importance of temporality across different intellectual traditions.

From a historical perspective, these theories should not be understood as mutually exclusive alternatives but as complementary stages in the evolution of philosophical reflection on time. Ibn Sina establishes the metaphysical foundations of temporality within the created cosmos (Gutas, 2014). Bergson redirects philosophical inquiry toward the qualitative experience of temporal continuity (Bergson, 1910/2001). Heidegger ultimately integrates temporality into the ontological analysis of human existence (Heidegger, 1962). Together these perspectives reveal an expanding philosophical horizon in which time gradually becomes the key to understanding not only the world but also consciousness, existence, and the meaning of Being itself.

This comparative framework also contributes to intercultural philosophy by demonstrating that Eastern and Western traditions engage with common philosophical problems despite their different

conceptual vocabularies (Nasr, 2006; Adamson, 2016). Ibn Sina's metaphysical realism, Bergson's philosophy of duration, and Heidegger's existential phenomenology should therefore be interpreted not as isolated intellectual systems but as complementary contributions to a universal philosophical dialogue concerning temporality. Such an approach challenges the conventional separation between Islamic and European philosophy and highlights the productive possibilities of comparative philosophical methodology.

The principal contribution of the present study lies in revealing that the historical development of the philosophy of time may be interpreted as a conceptual movement through three interconnected paradigms: time as the ontological measure of motion, time as lived duration, and time as existential temporality. These paradigms do not simply replace one another; rather, each preserves essential philosophical insights while simultaneously expanding the horizon within which temporality is understood. Accordingly, the philosophy of time appears not as a closed theoretical system but as an evolving field of inquiry that continues to illuminate fundamental questions concerning reality, consciousness, and human existence (Ricoeur, 1984; McGinnis, 2023).

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