



Factors In The Formation Of The Phenomenon Of Devaluation In Youth Consciousness And Their Socio-Philosophical Analysis

Karimov G'ulomnazir Xolmatxonovich

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Philosophical Sciences

Independent Researcher, Fergana State University (FarDU)

E-mail: karimovbek701@gmail.com | ORCID: 0009-0005-5177-5142

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the social and philosophical factors that form the phenomenon of devaluation in youth consciousness. The concept of devaluation is interpreted not as the simple disappearance of values, but as the weakening of their regulatory, motivational and existential force in everyday choices. The research uses an axiological and hermeneutic approach, comparative analysis of Uzbek and CIS philosophical literature, and an institutional reading of youth policy documents. The article identifies five factor groups: digital fragmentation of attention, consumer-instrumental perception of success, weakening intergenerational dialogue, uncertainty in education and employment trajectories, and the normalization of cynicism, aggression and moral indifference in symbolic environments. The results show that devaluation develops when values remain verbally accepted but lose the ability to organize behaviour, identity and responsibility. A socio-philosophical model is proposed in which family, education, mahalla, media literacy, legal culture and meaningful youth participation work as mutually reinforcing mechanisms of value renewal. The conclusion argues that youth devaluation should be addressed through dialogical, participatory and dignity-oriented institutions rather than through abstract moral appeals alone.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The problem of devaluation in youth consciousness is one of the most sensitive questions of contemporary social philosophy. It concerns not only the morality of separate individuals, but also the stability of the value system through which a society transfers meaning from one generation to another. In the Uzbek philosophical tradition, Q. Nazarov treats axiology as a special field that studies axiological consciousness, valuing, value-based worldview and the problems of valuing and devaluation [1. 20-21 b.]. This approach is important because it allows the analysis of youth not as a passive object of education, but as a subject whose consciousness is formed at the intersection of family memory, social institutions, digital communication and personal life strategies.

In this article the term devaluation denotes a process in which significant values lose their inner binding force for a young person. A value may still be praised in official language, family speech or educational discourse, but it becomes devalued when it no longer guides choice, responsibility and self-respect. For

example, knowledge may be verbally respected while learning is treated merely as a formal diploma; patriotism may be declared while civic responsibility is reduced to ritual; dignity may be recognized in principle while everyday communication tolerates humiliation or indifference. Therefore, devaluation is not identical with atheism, immorality or generational conflict. It is a more complex axiological displacement in which the hierarchy of meanings becomes unstable.

The relevance of this topic is strengthened by the demographic and institutional significance of youth in Uzbekistan. The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On State Youth Policy defines youth as citizens from fourteen to under thirty years of age and understands state youth policy as a system of socio-economic, organizational and legal measures for social formation and development of intellectual, creative and other potential [5. 3-modda]. The same law names the priority of spiritual, moral and cultural values among the principles of youth policy and emphasizes education in the spirit of patriotism, civic consciousness, tolerance, respect for law, national and universal values, and protection from harmful influences, violence and cruelty [5. 4-5-moddalar]. These legal norms show that the state itself regards youth consciousness as a strategic sphere of social development.

However, the existence of law and educational slogans does not automatically prevent devaluation. The contemporary young person grows in a field of contradictory influences: a family may transmit respect and modesty, social networks may promote instant visibility and aggressive comparison, the labour market may reward pragmatic flexibility, and peer groups may form their own informal moral codes. This plurality can enrich youth consciousness, but it can also produce value confusion. For this reason, the research question of the article is formulated as follows: which social and philosophical factors produce the phenomenon of devaluation in youth consciousness, and how can these factors be interpreted in a model that supports human dignity and responsible socialization?

The aim of the study is to construct a socio-philosophical analysis of the factors forming devaluation in youth consciousness and to propose a conceptual model of value renewal. The novelty of the article lies in treating devaluation not as a mere moral decline, but as a systemic interruption between value transmission, institutional credibility and personal agency. The article follows the imrad structure: the methods section explains the research design; the results section presents the factor matrix and model; the discussion section interprets the findings in relation to Uzbek and CIS philosophical thought; and the conclusion summarizes practical implications.

2. Materials and Methods

The article is based on qualitative socio-philosophical research. It does not present a new statistical survey; rather, it synthesizes philosophical concepts, youth policy norms and secondary empirical observations in order to build an explanatory model. The principal materials include Uzbek axiological literature, especially Q. Nazarov's work on the philosophy of values and devaluation; works of CIS scholars on culture, nonviolence and the ethical limitation of force; Uzbek legal documents regulating youth policy; and analytical materials concerning the challenges of youth education and employability. This selection is justified by the interdisciplinary nature of the problem: youth devaluation cannot be explained only by psychology, economics or pedagogy, because it concerns the social meaning of values.

The first method is axiological analysis. It clarifies what is devalued, how values lose their normative function, and why this loss affects dignity. Nazarov's interpretation of devaluation as a complex axiological process, not a sudden accident, is used as a conceptual base [1.53-58b.]. The second method is hermeneutic interpretation. It reads youth behaviour, media practices and institutional expectations as signs within a broader symbolic order. The third method is comparative analysis, through which Uzbek ideas about qadriyat, ma'naviyat and human dignity are compared with CIS philosophical discussions of culture, nonviolence and social self-organization.

The fourth method is institutional analysis. It examines how the family, education system, mahalla, media and state youth policy either preserve value continuity or unintentionally participate in devaluation. The fifth method is social-philosophical modelling. It translates the identified factors into a structured model that can be used for further empirical research or policy design. The logic of the research is not accusatory. It does not

claim that youth are less moral than previous generations. Instead, it asks how the modern environment reorganizes the relationship between value, choice and responsibility.

The validity of the interpretation is supported by triangulation of sources. Axiological concepts are taken from philosophical literature; institutional responsibilities are checked against legal documents; and social challenges are considered with reference to youth-related analytical data. For example, UNICEF's study of young people in Uzbekistan reported that education and employment were the two major concerns for respondents, at 77 percent and 61.8 percent respectively, while a significant share of young people were not in education, employment or training after compulsory secondary education [6.1 b.]. In this article such data are not used as final proof, but as indicators of social contexts in which value expectations and life opportunities may diverge.

3. RESULTS

The first result is conceptual. Devaluation in youth consciousness should be understood as a weakening of the value-regulating function of consciousness. A young person may know moral vocabulary, repeat patriotic or humanitarian formulas and recognize socially approved ideals, but still fail to internalize them as practical criteria. Thus, the phenomenon is not located only in the content of consciousness, but in the relation between knowledge, emotion and action. Nazarov's description of axiological consciousness as a form of social consciousness that reflects reality through the feeling of value helps to explain this connection [1. 20-21 b.]. When this feeling becomes weak, values are transformed into decorative words.

The second result is that devaluation has a multilevel structure. At the individual level it appears as indifference to self-development, loss of respect for one's own time, cynicism toward education, and readiness to exchange dignity for short-term visibility. At the micro-social level it appears in peer groups where mockery, exclusion or aggressive humour become normal forms of communication. At the institutional level it appears when official value language is not supported by fairness, quality education, meaningful work, transparent rules or respectful communication. The central mechanism is the same at all levels: a value loses authority when young people repeatedly observe that it is declared but not embodied.

The third result concerns the main factor groups. Digital fragmentation is the first group. Digital networks give young people access to knowledge, creative communication and civic participation, but they also accelerate attention, multiply contradictory messages and replace deep recognition with metrics of visibility. The problem is not the internet itself; it is the absence of critical value filtering. When attention is constantly captured by images of success without labour, pleasure without responsibility and conflict without reconciliation, values such as patience, learning, modesty and empathy may look slow or useless.

The second factor group is consumer-instrumental rationality. In this logic, success is measured primarily by immediate profit, status signs and external comparison. The danger is not material aspiration itself, because young people naturally need education, employment and economic independence. The danger arises when usefulness replaces meaning and when the person is evaluated only as a producer, buyer or competitor. V. S. Stepin's understanding of culture as a system of historically developing programs of human life activity shows why this factor is philosophically important: culture does not simply decorate life; it programs the reproduction and change of social life [3. 9-25 b.]. If cultural programs are reduced to consumption, the moral depth of youth consciousness becomes thinner.

The third factor group is the weakening of intergenerational dialogue. Traditional societies transmit values through family stories, respect for elders, neighbourhood solidarity and collective memory. In modern conditions, however, parents and teachers may lose symbolic authority if their language does not answer the real questions of young people. A young person may then treat national values as the property of the older generation rather than as a living resource for personal dignity. Uzbek researchers who study youth worldview in New Uzbekistan emphasize the role of family education, transformation of the education system, religious-spiritual environment, mass media and digital culture in shaping consciousness [4. 82-85 b.]. This confirms that value formation is distributed across several institutions and cannot be assigned to school alone.

The fourth factor group is uncertainty in education and employment trajectories. When young people experience a gap between effort and social mobility, their trust in knowledge, lawfulness and fairness may weaken. The result is not only economic frustration but also axiological fatigue: ideals seem beautiful but

impractical. The state youth policy framework recognizes this connection by including open and quality education, employment conditions, legal culture, social support and meaningful leisure among the directions of youth policy [5. 5-modda]. The philosophical implication is that values need social confirmation. A society cannot expect youth to internalize responsibility if pathways of responsible action appear blocked or unclear.

The fifth factor group is the normalization of cynicism, aggression and moral indifference. This factor is especially dangerous because it directly touches human dignity. If humiliation becomes entertainment, if cruelty is consumed as ordinary content, and if social success is imagined as domination over weaker people, then devaluation becomes linked with symbolic violence. A. A. Guseynov's ethical interest in nonviolence and R. G. Apressyan's argument that resistance to aggression must be ethically limited are useful for interpreting this factor [7. 235-272 b.; 8. 95-109 b.]. Youth consciousness needs not only prohibitions against violence but also a positive culture of respect, empathy and responsibility.

On the basis of these results, the article proposes the following socio-philosophical factor matrix. It shows that each factor has an external social source, an inner axiological mechanism and an institutional response.

Table 1. Social-philosophical matrix of devaluation factors in youth consciousness

Factor	Social source	Axiological mechanism	Preventive response
Digital fragmentation	Algorithmic speed, image-based comparison, unstable authority	Value attention becomes shallow; recognition is replaced by visibility	Media literacy, critical thinking, ethical digital culture
Consumer instrumentalism	Prestige competition and reduction of success to external signs	Meaning is replaced by usefulness and short-term advantage	Value education connected with labour, creativity and service
Weak dialogue of generations	Loss of shared language between youth, family and educators	Inherited values appear formal or outdated	Mentorship, family-school-mahalla cooperation, living examples
Trajectory uncertainty	Unequal access to quality education, employment and social mobility	Trust in knowledge and fairness weakens	Career guidance, inclusive education, youth entrepreneurship support
Cynicism and aggression	Humiliating communication, violent content, peer exclusion	Human dignity is normalized as negotiable	Restorative communication, nonviolent conflict skills, legal culture

The matrix demonstrates that devaluation is not caused by a single enemy. It is an effect of misalignment between social speed, institutional credibility and inner value orientation. Therefore, the solution cannot be reduced to prohibition. Prohibition is necessary against harmful content, violence and illegal acts, but value renewal requires more: meaningful participation, visible justice, respect-based communication and opportunities for socially useful self-realization.

The proposed model can be called a dignity-centered cycle of value renewal. It consists of six stages. The first stage is diagnosis: schools, families and local communities identify concrete signs of devaluation, such as indifference to learning, aggressive communication or loss of trust. The second stage is dialogue: adults do not merely lecture youth but listen to their experience and translate values into the language of present challenges. The third stage is inclusion: young people participate in decision-making, volunteer work, cultural projects and local problem solving. The fourth stage is competence: youth acquire media literacy, legal knowledge, emotional self-regulation and professional skills. The fifth stage is symbolic reinforcement: national and universal values are connected with real biographies, local heroes, family memory and social

service. The sixth stage is evaluation: institutions monitor whether values actually change behaviour, not only whether events were formally conducted.

The model is socio-philosophical because it links the inner structure of consciousness with social institutions. It also corresponds to the idea that culture reproduces social life through programs of activity [3. 9-25 b.]. Values become stable when they are repeated in practice, emotionally experienced, rationally understood and institutionally confirmed. If any of these elements is absent, devaluation begins.

A further result is the identification of four types of devaluation in youth consciousness. Soft devaluation appears when a young person respects a value in general but postpones its practical realization: for example, education is important, but systematic reading is delayed; respect is important, but online speech remains careless. Strategic devaluation appears when values are used instrumentally for personal advantage: public morality is performed in order to receive approval, while private behaviour follows another code. Defensive devaluation appears when a young person loses trust because of disappointment, humiliation or perceived injustice; in this case cynicism becomes a form of self-protection. Aggressive devaluation appears when dignity, compassion and legality are openly mocked and replaced by domination, cruelty or destructive group loyalty. These types may overlap, but their distinction is useful for educational practice because each requires a different response.

The soft type requires patient motivation and meaningful habits. The strategic type requires transparency and moral consistency from adults and institutions. The defensive type requires psychological support, fair treatment and restoration of trust. The aggressive type requires a combination of legal boundaries, conflict transformation and intensive value dialogue. In all cases, the key point is that youth consciousness does not change through pressure alone. It changes when a young person experiences a value as personally meaningful, socially respected and practically possible. Karimov and Turaev's idea of rational value orientations is relevant here because it connects value choice with conscious direction rather than with blind imitation [2. 5 b.].

The research also shows that devaluation has observable indicators. Cognitive indicators include confusion between freedom and permissiveness, inability to distinguish criticism from insult, and reduction of knowledge to certification. Affective indicators include shame deficit, empathy fatigue and indifference toward public goods. Behavioural indicators include avoidance of responsibility, imitation of harmful online trends, and treating violence or humiliation as entertainment. Communicative indicators include disrespectful speech, sarcasm as a dominant style, and refusal to listen. Institutional indicators include distrust of school, law, public initiatives or community organizations. These indicators should not be used to stigmatize young people. They are diagnostic signs that help educators and policymakers identify where value transmission has become weak.

Finally, the results suggest that the opposite of devaluation is not mechanical obedience. The opposite is conscious value orientation. A young person may critically discuss inherited norms and still remain value-oriented if the discussion is guided by truthfulness, dignity and responsibility. Therefore, the goal of social philosophy is not to freeze youth consciousness in the past, but to help it evaluate novelty without losing moral measure. In this sense, modernization and tradition should not be opposed. Modernization needs values in order to remain humane, while tradition needs renewal in order to remain alive.

4. DISCUSSION

The findings show that youth devaluation is best understood through the dialectic of continuity and change. Every generation revises the inherited value world, but revision becomes devaluation only when the young person loses the ability to distinguish between temporary fashion and durable meaning. In this sense, the phenomenon is not a conflict between old and young; it is a crisis of mediation. Values need mediators: family narratives, trustworthy teachers, just institutions, inspiring cultural symbols and peer communities that make dignity practically attractive.

Nazarov's analysis is especially important because he does not reduce devaluation to subjective caprice. He presents it as an axiological process with mechanisms and social consequences [1. 53-58 b.]. This allows the present article to avoid moral panic. The question is not why young people are supposedly worse, but why certain values lose their persuasive force in specific social conditions. If a young person sees corruption,

disrespect, social inequality or formalism, the value vocabulary of adults may be perceived as hypocrisy. Therefore, the prevention of devaluation requires moral consistency from institutions and adults.

The CIS philosophical context also clarifies the problem. Stepin's concept of culture explains why devaluation is not merely psychological. Culture programs forms of life; it teaches what is normal, desirable and shameful [3. 9-25 b.]. When the cultural environment rewards superficial popularity more than service, courage more than cruelty, or responsibility less than manipulation, the young person receives contradictory programs. The task of education is therefore not only to provide information, but to order these programs around human dignity.

The ethical discussions of Guseynov and Apressyan are relevant to the fifth factor group, where devaluation becomes connected with aggression and symbolic violence. A culture of nonviolence is not weakness; it is the disciplined refusal to treat another person as an object. At the same time, Apressyan's argument about ethically justified resistance to aggression reminds us that dignity must be protected by active responsibility, not by passive slogans [8. 95-109 b.]. In youth policy this means that schools and communities should develop skills of nonviolent conflict resolution, restorative justice, lawful self-protection and empathy.

A. P. Nazaretyan's studies of violence and cultural self-organization may also be interpreted in this direction: as societies become more complex, they require stronger cultural-psychological regulators to limit destructive impulses [9. 37-54 b.]. For youth consciousness, such regulators include shame before injustice, respect for the vulnerable, responsibility for digital speech and the ability to transform conflict into dialogue. Without these regulators, technological modernization may coexist with moral simplification.

One of the central practical implications is the need to connect national values with lived experience. National values are devalued when they are presented only as museum-like heritage or ceremonial vocabulary. They become powerful when young people see how honesty, respect for parents, love for the homeland, compassion, knowledge and service solve real problems. For example, patriotism becomes meaningful when it is linked with environmental responsibility, local volunteering, professional excellence and respect for the law. Human dignity becomes meaningful when every classroom, office and online community refuses humiliation.

Another implication concerns education. Value education should not be limited to separate moral lessons. It must be integrated into literature, history, philosophy, civic education, digital literacy and professional training. Students should be invited to analyze moral dilemmas, evaluate media narratives, compare national and universal values, and design community projects. Such practices transform values from abstract norms into personal competencies. This is consistent with the state youth policy direction that emphasizes quality education, legal culture, healthy development and protection from harmful influences [5. 5-modda].

The role of mahalla and family remains decisive. The family gives the first emotional grammar of value: what is respected, what is shameful, how disagreement is expressed, how elders and children are treated. Mahalla can either strengthen this grammar or leave youth alone before digital peer culture. Yet traditional institutions must also renew their language. If dialogue is replaced by command, young people may obey externally but devalue the message internally. Therefore, the effective model is participatory: youth should be seen not only as recipients of values but as co-creators of contemporary forms of those values.

The proposed model can be translated into several practical directions. First, each educational institution should create a value map of its own environment: what forms of speech are encouraged, how fairness is experienced, whether students can safely report humiliation, and whether moral topics are connected with real decisions. Second, youth organizations should move from event-centered activity to project-centered participation, where young people solve local social, ecological, cultural or legal problems. Third, digital literacy should include not only technical safety but also axiological safety: the ability to recognize manipulation, symbolic violence, false prestige and destructive comparison. Fourth, families and mahalla activists should receive methodological support for dialogue with adolescents and young adults, because many conflicts arise not from the absence of values but from the absence of a shared language for discussing them. The official orientation toward employment, inclusive education, intellectual and cultural development in the Youth of New Uzbekistan - 2030 agenda can be effective only when it becomes visible in everyday youth experience [10. 1 b.].

The limitations of the article should be noted. Since the research is theoretical and interpretive, it does not measure the prevalence of devaluation among specific groups of youth. Future studies may develop empirical indicators for the five factor groups proposed here and test them through surveys, interviews and comparative regional analysis. Nevertheless, the model has explanatory value because it connects philosophical categories with concrete institutional tasks. It can be used as a framework for educational programs, youth policy discussion and further academic inquiry.

5. CONCLUSION

The socio-philosophical analysis conducted in this article leads to the conclusion that devaluation in youth consciousness is a systemic axiological process. It emerges when values remain present in language but lose the power to regulate behaviour, identity and responsibility. The main factors of this process are digital fragmentation, consumer-instrumental rationality, weakened intergenerational dialogue, uncertainty in education and employment trajectories, and the normalization of cynicism or aggression. These factors do not act separately; they reinforce each other and create an environment in which dignity can become negotiable.

The prevention of devaluation therefore requires a dignity-centered cycle of value renewal. Diagnosis, dialogue, inclusion, competence, symbolic reinforcement and evaluation should become connected elements of family, school, mahalla, media and youth policy practice. Abstract moral appeals are insufficient if young people do not see values embodied in fair institutions, respectful communication and meaningful opportunities. The humanistic task of social philosophy is to show that values are not decorative slogans but conditions of a worthy life. In this sense, the renewal of youth consciousness is inseparable from the renewal of the social environment in which youth learn, work, communicate and dream.

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